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When Reinforcing Processes Generate an
Outcome-Quality Dip
When does market success indicate superior merit? We show that when consumer choices between products
with equal prices depend on quality but also on past popularity, more popular products are not necessarily
of higher quality. Rather, a medium level of popularity may be associated with lower quality than lower
levels of popularity. Using a formal model we show that this kind of non-monotonic association occurs when
reinforcing processes are strong. More generally, a dip can occur when outcomes depend on both quality
and resources and the latter are allocated bimodally, with some being given a lot of resources and most
receiving little. Empirically, we illustrate that such a dip occurs in the association between movie theater
sales and ratings. The presence of a dip in the outcome-quality association complicates learning from market
outcomes and evaluation of individuals and new ventures, challenges the legitimacy of stratification systems,
and creates opportunities for sophisticated evaluators who understand the dip.
Key words : reinforcing processes, quality, performance evaluation, movie industry, luck
1. Introduction
What can we learn about management and organizations from market outcomes? Are firms with a
high market share more likely to have superior management and effective routines than firms with
a low market share? In particular, consider a market in which the prices of competing products are
identical, for example where competing apps are free or all music singles cost the same. Organiza-
tions compete by trying to develop the best and most appealing product. Suppose consumers care
not only about product quality, but also about popularity. They prefer to select a higher-quality
product, but may select a lower-quality one if it happens to be very popular. Should we expect
products with higher shares of such markets to be of higher quality? The issue is not whether a
low-quality product may occasionally get lucky and end up with a high market share, as it is well
known that this can happen if choices are stochastic and subject to reinforcing processes (Arthur
1989, Lynn et al. 2009). Rather, the question is, should an informed observer expect products with
a higher market share to be, on average, of lower quality?
The answer to this question has implications for evaluating and learning from the success of
new products, ventures and individuals. If a higher market share indicates higher quality, mar-
ket outcomes can be used as a proxy for quality in evaluation and selection processes. It makes
1
Jerker Denrell and Chengwei Liu: The Outcome-Quality Dip
2 Article submitted to Organization Science; manuscript no. OS-MS-19-12480.R2
sense to reward individuals and firms with more successful market outcomes. However, if products
with a higher market share cannot be assumed to be of higher quality, learning from observed
outcomes and evaluating individuals and firms become more complicated. A “more-successful-is-
better” heuristic will be systematically misleading.
In this paper, we show that a higher market share may indicate lower expected quality when
consumers care about quality but also about popularity. Using a simple model of consumer choice
inspired by Arthur et al. (1987)’s non-linear Pólya urn model, we show theoretically that expected
quality and market share may vary non-monotonically. When the market share is low, expected
quality is an increasing function of the market share: a higher market share indicates higher
expected quality. This association becomes negative at a medium-level market share, when a higher
market share indicates lower expected quality. However, when the market share is high, the asso-
ciation becomes positive again, as a higher market share indicates higher expected quality.
A dip in the outcome-quality association occurs when strong reinforcing processes imply that a
product’s market share is converging to a value that is either high (when the product happened to
be chosen early on) or low (when it was not chosen early on). Strong reinforcement implies that
low-quality products chosen early on may obtain a higher market share than superior products
that were not chosen early on. The dip occurs because low-quality products either reach a very low
market share (when they were not chosen early on) or a medium-level market share (when they
were chosen early on). High-quality products in contrast reach either a below median-level market
share (when they were not chosen early on) or a high market share (when they were chosen early
on). The intuition behind the dip is that reaching a medium-level market share indicates that the
product was chosen early on and could do well. If the product only reached a medium-level market
share, despite having this initial advantage, it is likely a low-quality product.
More generally, we show that a dip can occur when resources are allocated bimodally. Reinforcing
processes are one way of generating bimodal allocations: when there is a strong reinforcing process,
a product may end up with a high or low installed base. In many settings, evaluators allocate most
resources to a few promising alternatives, generating a similar bimodal allocation of resources.
When the outcome depends on resources as well as quality, a dip may occur.
A dip is not only a theoretical possibility. We show that a dip occurs in the association between
movie sales and movie ratings in the action/adventure genres (ratings are based on movies’ average
scores on the Internet Movie Database website, www.imdb.com). Being associated with best-selling
movies is increasingly important for many actors, directors and writers (Baker and Faulkner 1991,
Elberse 2013), but movie sales are difficult to predict (De Vany 2004). Sales are also subject to
reinforcing processes, both before a movie is launched (e.g., movies perceived as likely hits receive
substantially more investment and are launched at many more theaters) and after its opening week
Jerker Denrell and Chengwei Liu: The Outcome-Quality Dip
Article submitted to Organization Science; manuscript no. OS-MS-19-12480.R2 3
(e.g., movies that do well during the opening week continue to be screened, while those that do
poorly are not). We find that the association between sales and ratings is non-monotonic, as average
ratings first increase with sales, then decrease with sales, and finally increase again at high sales
levels. Consistent with our theoretical mechanism, the data also show evidence of a separation into
two categories: “advantaged/lucky” movies that receive substantial investment and are screened
in many theaters, lifting their minimum sales; and “disadvantaged/unlucky” movies that receive
less investment and are screened in few theaters, limiting their sales potential. In contrast, we do
not find a dip in the drama genre, where reinforcing processes are weaker because these movies are
launched in considerably fewer theaters.
Our findings demonstrate how a bimodal allocation of resources, typically generated by a rein-
forcement process, may introduce a fundamental decoupling of outcomes and quality. In contrast
to previous studies, which have shown that the correlation between quality and outcomes may
become close to zero as a result of reinforcing processes (Arthur 1989, Carroll and Harrison 1994,
Chase 1980, Lynn et al. 2009), our model shows that the correlation may become negative for some
outcome intervals. The implication is that näıve reliance on a more-successful-is-better heuristic
may lead to unmeritocratic resource allocations. Nevertheless, such inefficiencies create opportu-
nities for more informed evaluators who understand the mechanism that generates a dip (Cattani
et al. 2018, Denrell et al. 2019). Our finding may also allow more nuanced interpretations of income
inequality and the role of luck (Frank 2016). In contrast to arguments for why the association
between income and merit should be strong overall (Herrnstein and Murray 1994) or weak overall
(Blau and Duncan 1967, Fischer et al. 1996), our model suggests a third possibility: the relation-
ship between income and individual traits may be non-monotonic with a negative association in
the middle.
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 reviews related literature on performance metrics,
evaluation, and reinforcing processes. Section 3 shows how a non-linear Pólya urn process generates
a non-monotonic association between choice and expected quality. Section 4 explains how a dip may
emerge when resources are allocated bimodally. In Section 5, we demonstrate that a dip occurs in
the association between movie sales and ratings in the action/adventure genres. Section 6 discusses
the scope conditions for a dip and the implications for the status-quality association, performance
evaluations and social inequality in interpreting market outcomes.
2. Performance Evaluation and Reinforcing Processes
Using observed performance to make inferences about the potential of individuals, products and
firms is central to organizational resource allocation processes, experiential learning and incentive
systems. When information on inputs and effort is unavailable, mistrusted or not understood, man-
agers rely on observed outputs to infer effort and merit (Ouchi 1979). However, drawing accurate
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inferences about future potential based on performance metrics is not easy (Meyer 2002, Star-
buck 2005). It poses challenges similar to the well-known difficulties of accurately learning from
experience (March 1994, March and Sutton 1997).
2.1. How Performance Metrics Should Be and Are Used
Several challenges make interpreting performance difficult (March and Sutton 1997). Observed per-
formance is often a noisy indicator of future potential. Initial sales may be based on a small sample
that is unrepresentative of future customers. Exceptional performance may be due to confounding
events, making it unclear whether observed performance should be attributed to the person or to
the situation (Ross and Nisbett 1991). For example, low sales during a recession should not neces-
sarily be attributed to poor management or inferior product quality. Externalities also complicate
attribution, as performance may depend on what others are doing. A new type of organization may
not perform well unless many others have adopted similar forms (Elster and Moene 1989, Carroll
and Harrison 1994). High performance in the short run may be associated with poor performance
in the long run, and vice versa. Cost-effective manufacturing techniques may be profitable only
after production has reached sufficient scale (Nelson and Winter 1982).
A normative theory of rational inferences from noisy performance indicators has been developed
in engineering, statistics and economic contract theory (Harris and Raviv 1978, Holmstrom 1979,
Milgrom 1981). According to this theory, performance evaluation should be based on informa-
tive indicators, and the weight given to any indicator should reflect its relevance and precision
(Holmstrom 1979). The confounding effects of profit shocks common to all can be eliminated by
measuring performance relative to the average of others operating in similar settings (Holmstrom
1979, Lazear and Rosen 1981). Subjective evaluations by boards or managers (Bushman et al.
1996) and non-financial measures (Gan et al. 2020) should be used to capture information that
is not reflected in market- and accounting-based metrics. Long-term performance indicators can
be used to avoid short-termism. It may even be rational for evaluators to reward initial failure in
order to encourage exploration (Manso 2011).
Given that evaluators are boundedly rational, organizations also face the challenge of structuring
the evaluation process to minimize bias and increase the precision of overall evaluations (Simon
1947). Noise can be reduced by averaging individual evaluations (Galton 1907, Surowiecki 2004).
Biased and imperfect evaluators can be combined, structuring the decision process to achieve an
overall evaluation with low bias and variance that approximates to a preferred trade-off between
errors of commission and omission (Sah and Stiglitz 1986, Christensen and Knudsen 2010, Csaszar
2013, Keum and See 2017). To improve accuracy, organizations also try to de-bias individual
evaluators or rely on statistical algorithms rather than human judgment (Dawes et al. 1989).
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These normative recommendations are not always understood or adhered to. Observations of
how performance metrics are actually used in organizations show that measures are misinterpreted
or taken too literally, contextual information is ignored, subjective evaluations introduce bias,
and long-term consequences are not salient (Hopwood 1972, Townley et al. 2003, Mazmanian and
Beckman 2018). For example, Townley et al. (2003) quote a division manager as saying “we were
told to improve the indicators and measures without a concern with underlying reality” (2003, p.
1061).
Several strands of organizational research explain why performance metrics are used inappro-
priately. Research in organizational sociology shows that formal evaluation metrics may become
institutionalized and taken for granted (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Espeland and Sauder 2007, Coly-
vas 2012). When a performance metric is commonly used, managers may feel compelled to use
it even if the context is inappropriate. This is partly because such metrics are taken for granted,
and partly because conventional metrics provide a focal point when there is uncertainty about the
metrics on which others will evaluate us (Correll et al. 2017). Universities know that they will be
evaluated by students based on how well they perform in rankings, and therefore care about rank-
ings even though many faculty members believe they are based on faulty methodologies (Espeland
and Sauder 2007). Performance metrics also become embedded in organizational structures and
routines, become valued in themselves, and are difficult to change when they are no longer appro-
priate (Colyvas 2012, Mazmanian and Beckman 2018). Behavioral research shows that people do
not always understand performance metrics, and do not take mitigating circumstances sufficiently
into account. They tend to over-attribute outcomes to the person in charge and discount situational
influences (Ross and Nisbett 1991). They focus too much on the outcome achieved—particularly
when it is perceived as a success or failure—and take insufficient account of the setting in which
this outcome was achieved (Baron and Hershey 1988, Marshall and Mowen 1993). As a result,
professional sports teams pay too much for players with high past performance that does not last
(Massey and Thaler 2013), and banks pay too much for security analysts whose performance does
not transfer to their new organization (Groysberg et al. 2008). Experimental studies show that peo-
ple focus on activities that improve short-term performance without understanding their negative
long-term consequences (Sterman 1989, Herrnstein et al. 1993). They also misinterpret common
performance metrics, such as returns on investment (Shapira and Shaver 2014), and do not fully
understand the advantages of averaging forecasts (Larrick and Soll 2006) and using structured
interviews (Dana et al. 2013).
2.2. Reinforcing Processes
Interpreting business performance is complicated by the fact that current performance is influenced
by past performance (March and Sutton 1997). Success in the past may increase the chances of
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success in the future. This reinforcing process may amplify luck (Arthur 1989, Salganik et al. 2006)
and lead to a low correlation between quality and performance (Lynn et al. 2009).
Product and market success are subject to several types of reinforcing process (Arthur 1989,
Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). The utility of a product may depend on the number or pro-
portion of others using the same product, partly because a commonly used product attracts more
complementary products (e.g., games for game consoles). Such network externalities imply that
adopters are concerned not only about attributes, but also about whether many other adopters have
or will adopt the same product (Katz and Shapiro 1986). The implication is that a lower-quality
product may end up dominating the market as a result of gaining an early lead (Arthur 1989).
Empirical studies demonstrate that network externalities impacts adoption (Nair et al. 2004) and
explains market dominance in the video cassette recording (Park 2004) and video game console
industries (Dubé et al. 2010), although network effects are not always strong enough to stop later
entrants with high-quality products from eventually dominating (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995,
Tellis et al. 2009, Zhu and Iansiti 2012, Gretz and Basuroy 2013).
Having many users may also increase future adoption, because people assume that a commonly-
used product is better (Bikhchandani et al. 1992), feel pressured to conform (Asch 1955), or are
more likely to have heard of it. Salganik et al.’s (2006) web-based experiment on music downloads
illustrates the strength of social influences on adoption. They set up a website with 48 songs
that participants could listen to and download. The experiment was repeated with eight different
participant pools, generating data from eight worlds. The results show that when popular songs
were displayed prominently (at the top of the website), early popularity strongly impacted on
the eventual outcome. For example, a song of medium quality (Song no 31, quality assessed by
independent ratings) became the most popular song in one of the eight worlds when it happened
to be popular early on. Early popularity does not always have such a large impact (Azoulay et al.
2014, van de Rijt et al. 2014, 2016, van de Rijt 2019). Reinforcing processes will be stronger when
consumers are aware only of popular products, when initially popular products or individuals
that do well are given additional resources, and when consumers have strong incentives to select
apparently superior products (Vincenz and van de Rijt 2016, van de Rijt 2019).
2.3. Our Contribution
It is well known that reinforcing processes may lead to a low correlation between quality and
realized performance, because even low-quality products may occasionally achieve success if they
happen to gain early popularity (Arthur 1989, Carroll and Harrison 1994, Chase 1980, Lynn et al.
2009, Merton 1968, Skvoretz et al. 1996). However, previous literature has not questioned whether
higher performance indicates higher quality. The correlation between quality and performance in
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past models can be close to zero yet remain positive (Lynn et al. 2009). If the correlation is positive,
it still makes sense to reward and imitate the highest performers, because on average they are
more skilled than lower performers. Our interest lies in when reinforcing processes imply that
the correlation between performance and quality may be negative for some levels of performance.
Specifically, when is expected quality based on observed performance, E[qi|pi], a decreasing function
of observed performance for some ranges of pi? We are interested in this because if E[qi|pi] is a
decreasing function of pi, näıve reliance on performance metrics—assuming that better performance
indicates higher quality—will lead to biased and unmeritocratic resource allocations.
There is very little research on the social and economic mechanisms that imply that expected
quality given performance is a decreasing function of performance. It is well-known in statistics
and economics that such non-monotonicity may occur. For example, when the error distribution
is fat-tailed (Denrell and Liu 2012, Weibull et al. 2007), such a set-up violates the “monotone-
likelihood-ratio” condition required for E[qi|pi] to be an increasing function of pi (Karlin and
Rubin 1956, Milgrom 1981). Economic research on “bandwagons” also shows that in some settings
imitating the minority may be rational (Callander and Hörner 2009, Eyster and Rabin 2014). The
paper most closely related to ours is Denrell and Liu’s (2012) model of how rich-get-rich dynamics
imply that top performance is an unreliable indicator of quality. They assume that the strength of
reinforcing processes differs among markets/settings and is unknown to evaluators. In their model,
an extreme result (e.g., a very high market share) indicates that reinforcing processes are strong,
which in turn implies that evaluators should regard the outcome as an unreliable indicator of
quality. This mechanism is compelling in some settings, but does not always apply (Liu 2020). For
example, it would not be applicable if it was known that reinforcing processes in an industry are
strong due to network externalities. Our contribution is to show more generally that higher market
share can be associated with lower quality due to a bimodal allocation of resources.
3. Model
Inspired by Arthur (1989), we analyze a simple model of how consumers choose between two com-
peting products. These consumers care about both quality and the proportion of other consumers
who have selected each product. We describe a scenario in which they want not only to choose
the best product with the highest level of quality, but also to coordinate their choices with others,
perhaps due to network externalities. Consumers may also prefer popular products owing to social
influences, because they believe that popular products are superior or because they are more likely
to have heard of them.
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3.1. Set-up
In each period, t= 1,2, ..., a consumer arrives and selects between two competing products, j = 1,2.
The utility of selecting product j = 1,2 in period t is uj,t = aqj + bmj,t−1, where qj is the quality of
product j, mj,t−1 is the market share of product j in period t−1, a> 0 is the importance of quality,
and b is the importance of market share. Because market shares sum to one, m2,t−1 = 1−m1,t−1.
In period one, when m1,t−1 is not defined, we set m1,0 =m2,0 = 0.5. We assume that the prices of
the two products are identical (e.g., two apps are both free), so the customer’s choice does not
depend on price. We model the decision process as probabilistic, whereby consumers usually, but
not always, select the product with the highest level of utility.1 Specifically, the probability that











which is the well-known logit choice model. The probability of selecting product 1 is an increasing
function of its relative quality, q1− q2, and its market share, m1,t. We are interested in whether a
higher market share necessarily signals higher quality. To address this question, we fix the quality
of the second product to 0.5 (we obtain similar results if we allow q2 to vary). We allow the quality
of product 1 to vary across simulations of the model. Specifically, in each simulation q1 is drawn
from a uniform distribution between zero and one at the start (t= 0) and remains the same for all
periods. If we simulate the model k times, we thus simulate k pairs of products competing for t
periods, where q1 is redrawn in each of k simulations from a uniform distribution, and q2 is fixed
at 0.5. Hence, each simulation models a sequence of competitions between a firm with product 1
of unknown quality (q1), and a firm with a product of known medium quality (q2 = 0.5).
3.2. Results
How does the market share achieved by product 1 after 10 or 100 periods reflect its quality? One
might imagine that a higher market share indicates a higher expected value of q1; in other words,
E[q1|m1,t] is an increasing function of m1,t. When b= 0 and utility depends only on quality, this
is true; but it is not true if b > 0 and consumers care about the product’s past market share when
making a selection. As Figure 1 shows, when b is sufficiently large, E[q1|m1,t] is a decreasing function
of m1,t for intermediate values of m1,t. In such cases, there is a middle dip in E[q1|m1,t]: expected
quality initially increases, then decreases, but increases again with higher market share levels.
1 Arthur (1989) assumed that consumers always choose their preferred alternative, but that consumers differ in their
evaluation of alternatives. Such heterogeneity in preferences is one way of interpreting a probabilistic choice model
such as ours.
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Figure 1 Expected quality of firm 1 given the market share firm 1 obtained in the last period when a= 1 and
A) b= 1, B) b= 2.5 and C) b= 4. These results are based on numerical integration, see Appendix D.















Figure 2 Combinations of a and b for which there is a “dip” in expected quality given the observed market share.
These results are based on numerical integration, see Appendix D.
Figure 2 shows the combinations of a and b for which a dip in E[q1|m1,t] occurs. A dip requires
that the importance of past market share, b, is sufficiently large compared to the importance of
quality, a. In fact, in the long term, as t→∞, it can be demonstrated formally that a dip occurs
whenever b > 2, regardless of the value of a and for any distribution of quality (see Theorem EC.2
in Appendix A).
3.3. Intuition
Why does a dip occur, and why does the occurrence of a dip depend on the value of b? Figure 3
shows that a dip occurs when there is a bimodal distribution of market share. If b is sufficiently
large, the reinforcing process is strong enough for product 1 to secure a market share of either close
to one or close to zero, depending on whether it is lucky and initially frequently chosen, or unlucky
Jerker Denrell and Chengwei Liu: The Outcome-Quality Dip
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(Figure 3B). However, the market share that product 1 obtains also depends on its quality. A high-
quality product (q = 0.9) with good initial fortune will nearly always reach a market share above
90%, while a low-quality product (q= 0.1) with good initial fortune will reach a market share close
to 80%. Similarly, a high-quality product without initial luck will tend to reach a market share
close to 15%, while a low-quality product without initial luck will nearly always reach a market
share lower than 10%. Reaching a market share of around 80% or below 10% is thus typical of a
low-quality product, while a market share above 90% or around 15% is typical of a high-quality
product (Figure 3B).
It follows that high-quality products are more likely than low-quality products to achieve either a
very high market share (above 90%) or a market share of around 15%. To illustrate this more clearly,
Figure 3D plots the proportion of high- versus low-quality products for different market share
levels; more specifically, it plots P (m1,100|q1 = 0.9) divided by P (m1,100|q1 = 0.9) + P (m1,100|q1 =
0.1) for different values of m1,100. As shown, high-quality products are overrepresented both at
very high levels of market share and at market shares close to 20%. Low-quality products are
overrepresented at very low levels of market share but also at market shares close to 80%. This
provides an explanation for the dip: both a very low market share (below 10%) and a quite high
market share (at 80%) are indications of low quality.
No such dip occurs when b is low enough, because the distribution of market shares is then uni-
modal rather than bimodal (Figure 3A). In this scenario, low-quality products are overrepresented
among products with low market shares, medium-quality products are in the middle region, and
high-quality products at high levels of market share (Figure 3C), implying that a higher market
share indicates higher quality.
To explain why there is a bimodal distribution of market shares only when b is large enough,
Figures 4A and 4B plot how the choice probability varies with past market shares for low and high
levels of b. In the long term, the market shares to which product 1 will converge are the equilibrium
points at which the choice probability equals past market share: P1,t+1 =mi,t. Graphically, these
equilibrium points, or so-called “fixpoints”, are the points at which the choice probability function,
P1,t+1, crosses the “45-degree” line. Only fixpoints at which the choice probability function, P1,t+1,
crosses the “45-degree” line from below are stable, in the sense that if the market share deviates
slightly from this point, it will tend to revert back to this point (for further technical details, see
Appendix A). Past work on Pólya urn models demonstrates that in the long run, the process will
only converge to these stable fixpoints (Arthur et al. 1987, Hill et al. 1980).
When b is large enough, there is a possibility of multiple stable fixpoints (Figure 4B). A product
of intermediate quality (i.e., between 0.35 and 0.65) may converge to either a high or low level of
market share. Very low- or very high-quality products, on the other hand, can only converge to
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Figure 3 (A) and (B): distribution of market share achieved by firm 1 after 100 periods (m1,100) for three levels
of quality, when a= 1 and b= 1 or b= 2.5. (C) and (D): proportion of high- versus low-quality individuals
at different market share levels. These results are based on numerical integration, see Appendix D.








































D) b = 2.5








































C) b = 1
Figure 4 (A) and (B): how the probability that the consumer will select product 1, P1,t+1 in period t+ 1 varies
with the market share, mi,t, at three levels of quality, when a= 1 and b= 1 or b= 2.5. (C) and (D):
quality as a function of the market share reached as t→∞.
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one market share level. The possibility of multiple equilibria generates a dip (Figure 4D): expected
quality initially increases with market share, up to the level to which high-quality products (about
0.65) without early luck can converge (a market share around 30%). There is then a gap in the
market share distribution. At about 70%, expected quality again increases in market share. How-
ever, a market share of around 70% is associated with a quality of about 0.35, which is lower than
the quality associated with a market share of 30%. When b is lower, there is only one stable fixpoint
(Figure 4A), which implies that a higher market share indicates higher quality (Figure 4C).
3.4. Scope Conditions
Whether or not a dip occurs depends on the parameters of the model. In particular, a dip does
not occur if past choices only weakly impact future choices, i.e., a dip requires a sufficiently high
value of b. An even larger value of b is required for a dip if a product’s utility is a strongly concave
or convex function of its market share. Consider a model identical to the basic model introduced
above, except that uj,t = aqj + bm
k
j,t−1. Previously, we assumed that k = 1. If k < 1, utility is a
concave function of the market share, and if k > 1, utility is a convex function of market share.
Computations show that a dip occurs even when k > 1 or k < 1, but if k differs significantly from
one, a dip only occurs if b is high. The intuition is that when k differs significantly from one,
changes in market share have little impact on a product’s utility at high (concave function) or low
(convex function) values. For example, when k= 1, a dip occurs after 100 periods when a= 1 and
b is larger than approximately 1.8. When k= 5, b needs to be larger than 2.8. Similarly, if k= 0.5,
b must be larger than 2.2, and when k= 0.2, it must be larger than 3.0.
Moreover, a dip does not occur in the long term if quality does not influence the choice probability
for sufficiently popular products. This may happen when utility depends on the number rather
than the proportion of past consumers who have selected product j. Suppose uj,t = aqj + bnj,t−1,
where nj,t−1 is the number of consumers who have selected product j during periods 1 to t− 1.
If b is large enough, this model also implies that product 1 will secure either a very high or a
very low market share. Yet this model does not generate a dip. Rather, average quality is an
increasing function of the obtained market share.2 To understand why, note that when t is large,
n1,t−1−n2,t−1 will become a very large positive or negative number. Hence, the choice probability
will be influenced mainly by n1,t−1−n2,t−1, and the quality of product 1 will be inconsequential. In
the long term, the choice probability will become one or zero, regardless of the quality of product
1. Thus, when utility depends on the difference in numbers (which may be unbounded), quality
determines the probability that product 1 will win, but does not determine the market share if
2 When b is large, the market share of product 1 converges to either zero or one. Still, average quality is higher for
products with a market share equal to one than for those with a market share equal to zero.
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product 1 wins, because all winning firms will achieve a market share equals to one. In contrast, if
utility depends on the proportion (which is bounded), quality determines both the probability of
winning (i.e., obtaining a market share larger than 50%) and the market share that product 1 will
secure if it wins. Whether quality influences the choice probability of popular products depends
on the setting. If people assume that the most popular product is superior, and this overrides
their own information, all may choose it irrespective of actual quality (Bikhchandani et al. 1992).
However, if having few others selecting the same option is sufficient to convince people to choose
a minority option they prefer (Asch 1955), only products that most believe are high-quality will
become widespread.
If quality does influence the choice probability of popular products, as is true in our basic set-up
when the utility of a product depends on the proportion of past consumers, then the existence
of a dip (when b is sufficiently large) is robust to several modifications of the model. First, we
assumed that quality has a uniform distribution, but a dip occurs for many other distributions
(see Appendix B for details). Indeed, Theorem EC.2 in Appendix A shows that a dip occurs in the
long term whenever b > 2 for any (continuous) distribution of quality on [0,1]. Second, a dip also
occurs in a model with more than two competing products (see Appendix B for details).
Third, a dip also occurs for probabilistic choice models other than the logit model. For example,
Theorem EC.3 in Appendix A shows that a dip occurs in the long term for the probit choice
model (i.e., product 1 is selected in period t if u1,t + ε1,t >u2,t + ε2,t, where εj,t are independently
drawn from a standard normal distribution) whenever b >
√
π. The crucial feature of both of these
probabilistic choice models is that the probability of choosing product 1, P (u1,t−u2,t), is a convex
function for u1,t − u2,t < 0 and a concave function for u1,t − u2,t > 0. These properties imply that
two stable fixpoints exist in the mapping of P (z)− z. Lemma EC.1 in Appendix A shows that a
large class of probabilistic choice models share these features: any random utility model in which
individual i selects product 1 if ui,1 + ε1,i > ui,2 + ε2,i, where εj,i are drawn independently from
a unimodal distribution, has the same essential features (i.e., convex for m < 0.5 and concave
for m> 0.5) and generates a dip if b is sufficiently large (Theorem EC.1). The assumption of a
unimodal error term makes sense when large errors are less frequent than small ones. In contrast, if
large positive and negative errors are both more frequent than small errors, a dip cannot occur (in
the long run). However, dip can occur in the short term even for choice models that do not imply
a dip in the long term. In particular, a dip occurs in the short term for a linear probability model:
P1,t+1 = wq1 + (1−w)m1,t. For example, a dip occurs after 100 periods as long as 0<w < 0.242.
However, in this linear model, the dip disappears as t→∞ because there can only be one fixpoint
for this linear function, but if w= 0.1, a dip occurs even after 20,000 periods.
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4. A Bimodal Allocation of Resources Generates the Dip
In the model in Section 3, market share is subject to a reinforcing process which, if sufficiently
strong, leads to a bimodal distribution and a dip in the market share-quality association. However,
a reinforcing process, operating sequentially over several periods, is not necessary to generate a dip.
Reinforcing processes are just one of many ways of generating a bimodal allocation of resources.
Whenever there is a bimodal allocation, a dip may occur. The following simple resource allocation
model illustrates this more general mechanism.
We consider a setting where an evaluator has to decide how much resource to allocate to a set
of individuals or products. For example, investors, funding agencies or movie company executives
must decide which firms, researchers or movies to sponsor. We imagine that an outcome (financial
success, publications or box office takings) depends on quality as well as on resources: oi = qi+ri. In
the model presented in Section 3, the outcome was the market share, and the additional resources
were the installed base (i.e., the past market share). In the resource allocation model, the outcome
might be the product’s sales levels, the number of citations an academic paper receives, or the
movie’s box office takings. Quality is some fixed trait that impacts on the outcome (e.g., skill,
business acumen or appeal). For simplicity, we assume that there are only four levels of quality: 1,
2, 3 and 4. Resources include financial and social capital that increase the chances of achieving a
better outcome.
When does a dip occur in the resource allocation model? If all products receive the same level
of resources (i.e., ri is the same for all i), a higher outcome (higher oi) will indicate higher quality
(Figure 5A) and there will be no dip. However, a dip may emerge when there are two levels of
resources: few (ri = 0) or many (ri = h) (see Figure 5B). Suppose that the lowest-quality products
(equal to 1) never receive many resources and the highest-quality products (4) always receive many
resources, whereas medium-quality products (2 and 3) may receive either few or many resources. In
this case, a dip may occur. Specifically, a dip occurs whenever h> 1. When h> 1, a product with
a quality level of 2 that happens to receive many resources will achieve a higher outcome (2 + h)
than a product with a quality level of 3 that receives no resources and obtains an outcome of 3.
This is true for any distribution of quality, with some probability at each level. It is also true for
any process where resources are allocated to products with different quality levels, which allows
for “allocation mistakes” in that a product with a quality of 2 may receive more resources than a
product with a quality of 3.
The general mechanism behind the dip in this resource allocation model is the same as the
reason for the dip in the model in Section 3. First, there is a bimodal distribution of resources
(i.e., products receive either few or many resources); Second, an allocation mistake is possible;
Third, both quality and resources impact on the final outcome. These three features imply that
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Figure 5 Quality as a function of achieved outcomes when (A) all products receive equal resources and (B)
products receive either a few or many resources.
the distribution of outcomes will be bimodal, and a moderately high outcome will be associated
with relatively low quality.
The dip that occurs in the resource allocation model hinges on the fact that the distribution of
resources invested is bimodal. When would this investment pattern make sense? The answer is that
focusing resources on a single or a few investments makes sense when there are increasing returns to
investments (Wernerfelt and Karnani 1987). Suppose, for example, that the management of a movie
company believes that there is a winner-takes-all dynamic in movie sales, where one or at most a
few movies attract the bulk of attention. If so, it would make sense to invest substantial resources
in a few movies that seem promising, with limited investments in most others (to spread the risk).
More generally, if past success increases the chance of future success, investors may rationally
allocate more resources to early winners, anticipating that these are more likely to succeed in the
future (Katz and Shapiro 1986, Arthur 1989). Such a winner-takes-all investment policy will further
increase early winners’ chances of success (Merton 1968).
5. Empirical Illustration: Movie Sales and Ratings
Our theoretical argument shows that a dip may occur when the final outcome depends on quality
but is also significantly impacted by resources allocated to early winners, through a reinforcing
process or a resource allocation decision based on anticipated success, and when decisions are
made under considerable uncertainty about quality. The movie industry fits these criteria. An
important outcome in the movie industry is box office sales. Previous studies have shown that
these sales depend not only on the movie’s characteristics (i.e., its quality or appeal to movie-goers,
often measured by review scores), but also on resource allocation decisions about investments in
production and marketing budgets, and the number of theaters in which the movie will be released.
Investments increasingly follow a bimodal pattern, whereby movie companies invest considerable
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resources in a few movies that are anticipated to be popular, with the aim of these movies achieving
“blockbuster” status (Baker and Faulkner 1991, Elberse 2013, Eliashberg et al. 2000).
Unlike in our theoretical models, significant resource allocation decisions in the movie industry
do not occur in every period, as in the model in Section 3, or only once, as in the resource allocation
model, but at a few important stages in the movie’s production. At these stages, decision makers
rely on different types of information to estimate future popularity. First, decisions about financing
and the production budget are based on the initial pitch and the quality of the screenplay. At this
point, no sales data are available. The second crucial resource allocation decision is made at the
distribution stage. Based on pre-screenings with test audiences and intuition regarding the size of
the market for this type of movie, distributors make crucial decisions about marketing budgets, as
well as the number of theaters in which the movie will be released. With a few exceptions, movies
initially launched in only a few theaters are unlikely to attract many movie-goers (De Vany 2004,
Zuckerman and Kim 2003). Conversely, launching a movie in many theaters typically ensures a
higher minimum level of box office sales. A third resource allocation decision is made after the
opening weekend, and at this point sales data are available. Movies that do well during their
opening week are allocated additional theater screens or continue to be shown on a large number
of screens, which enables them to continue to perform well (De Vany 2004, Elberse and Eliashberg
2003). However, movies that have poor ticket sales during their opening weekend are allocated
fewer theater screens, limiting their future sales potential.
Although resource allocation decisions are crucial, and movie studios focus increasingly on invest-
ing in movies that are most likely to become blockbusters, the association between the amount of
resource allocated and movie ratings (by critics, as well as the general public) is weak, owing in part
to the difficulty of predicting movie-goers’ reactions accurately (De Vany 2004). To illustrate this
decoupling, consider the film “Speed 2: Cruise Control” starring Sandra Bullock and Willem Dafoe,
which was released on June 15, 1997 as a sequel to the financially successful film “Speed” released
in 1994. This sequel garnered domestic box office sales of 48 million USD, but earned a disastrous
IMDB rating of 3.7 (on a scale of 0 to 10), ranking in the 3rd percentile of all movies rated on the
website. It was nominated for eight Golden Raspberry Awards, which are tongue-in-cheek awards
given annually to movies widely considered to be awful, and won the award for “Worst Remake or
Sequel”. Despite the overwhelmingly negative reviews, the success of “Speed” enabled this sequel
to receive considerable financial investment and broad distribution, creating an early advantage as
it was screened at most theaters in the United States (n= 2,615). This advantage was sufficient
to boost box-office sales, making it the number one movie during its opening weekend. However,
its poor quality quickly led distributors and theater owners to replace it with other movies (it was
screened for six weeks in total, much shorter than other opening-week box office winners).
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Contrast the fate of “Speed 2” with that of “The Boondock Saints”, released on January 21,
2000, which also included Willem Dafoe, as well as Sean Patrick Flanery. The story centers around
two brothers from Boston who try to “clean up” their city by massacring local criminals. Its total
domestic box office sales reached only 30,471 USD, but it was highly-rated on IMDB (with an
average rating of 7.8, approximately the 93rd percentile). This film, with a budget of 6 million
USD, was a box office failure because it was only distributed to five theaters for one week. The
movie script had been regarded as promising and had been sought after by major studios, including
New Line Cinema, Paramount Pictures and Miramax. However, after the movie was completed,
every major distributor refused to be associated with it owing to the recent Columbine High School
massacre, which occurred on April 20, 1999. This unfortunate coincidence eliminated this movie’s
chances of gaining high box office sales, even though it was highly regarded by those who watched
it later on DVD/Blu-Ray or through streaming services.
The importance of a movie’s budget and the number of theaters in which it is released, the
bimodal pattern of resource allocation, and the weak association between quality and resource
allocation suggest that a dip may exist in the association between movie quality (as measured
by ratings) and outcomes (as measured by box office sales). In particular, there appears to be
two “playing fields” in this industry. Movies believed to have low potential are allocated limited
resources and open in a few theaters, limiting their sales potential, while movies anticipated to
do well are allocated substantial budgets and open in many theaters, enabling much higher sales
potential. In particular, opening in a large number of theaters helps to place a floor under box
office revenues, so the lower decile increases substantially (De Vany, 2004: 135). In both fields, sales
also depend on quality (De Vany, 2004). High-quality movies that open at few theaters do better
than low-quality movies that also open at few theaters. High-quality movies that open at many
theaters do better than low-quality movies that also open at many theaters. This suggests that a
dip may exist for movies that have moderate box office sales, which may be low-quality movies
that happen to have received substantial resources.
An important caveat is that not all movies are produced and launched with the intention of
maximizing sales. Some, especially those produced by independent moviemakers, focus on a niche
market and are deliberately released in a limited number of theaters. We alleviate this problem
by focusing on the action/adventure genres, in which financial and distribution support matter
most, and there are few independent moviemakers (Zuckerman and Kim 2003). We also compare
the results with movies in the drama genre, in which a large proportion of movies are produced by
independent moviemakers.
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5.1. Data
To examine whether a dip occurs in the movie sales-rating association, we collected data on movie
sales and movie ratings from multiple sources. Using cumulative box office sales as the outcome
measure, we obtained data from “The Numbers” (www.the-numbers.com), which is based on the-
ater box office earnings in the United States and Canada, for 28,103 movies released between 1948
and 2016.3 We collected average movie ticket prices from 1910 to 2017 from the National Associa-
tion of Theatre Owners (NATO), which has conducted annual surveys of its members since 1989
and uses the consumer price index (CPI) to estimate the average movie ticket price for each year
prior to 1989. We adjusted box office revenues against movie ticket prices, using 2010 as the base
year.
We used movie review scores to measure the “quality” of a movie. It is, of course, very difficult
to define and measure the true quality of a movie, and this is not our intention. In our models, we
use the term “quality” to denote a stable trait (fixed over time) that impacts the probability that
a consumer will select a product. In the same spirit, we rely on review scores to measure attributes
of movies that impact whether the relevant audience will view them favorably.4 IMDB scores are
based on reviews submitted by general audiences and reflect their tastes rather than those of
experts, such as movie critics. Nevertheless, IMDB scores are significantly and positively associated
with critical evaluations. Brown et al. (2012) show that the correlation between Metacritic.com
ratings, which are based on several movie critics’ reviews, and IMDB scores is 0.75 for movies
released between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2009. IMDB data for all the movies were
collected in February 2017. Because most IMDB movie ratings stabilize about three months after
the opening weekend (Holbrook and Addis 2007), we expected the review scores to have stabilized
for all movies in our dataset.
We obtained 709,488 review scores from IMDB (www.imdb.com). We excluded all non-movie
data. We compared the review data with our box office data and only included movies for which
data on the title, production year and production company matched. This resulted in 8,738 movies
for which information was available on both review scores and inflation-adjusted cumulative box
office sales. To examine how early outcomes influenced final box office sales, we collected information
3 To cross-validate the accuracy of box office sales data, we also downloaded data from Box Office Mojo
(www.boxofficemojo.com), which were largely consistent, although we excluded 197 movies where inconsistencies were
larger than 100,000 USD.
4 Review scores are not necessarily stable because they can be impacted by box office sales. Nevertheless, if review
scores were (positively) influenced by box office sales, it would presumably generate a monotonic pattern, working
against a dip. Endogeneity could only create a dip if the impact of sales on review scores were negative. This negative
impact is more likely in the drama genre where box office success attracts audiences with diverse tastes (Kovacs and
Sharkey 2014), and is less likely in the action/adventure genres where audience taste is more homogeneous (De Vany
2004).
Jerker Denrell and Chengwei Liu: The Outcome-Quality Dip
Article submitted to Organization Science; manuscript no. OS-MS-19-12480.R2 19
about movies’ opening-week box office sales and production costs, as well as the number of theaters
in which they opened.5 We obtained data on production costs from The Numbers and data on
opening-week box office sales and number of theaters from Box Office Mojo, resulting in 2,621
movies with reliable information for all three variables and 1,746 movies with reliable information
for these three variables as well as eventual box office sales and IMDB ratings. Opening-week box
office sales were also adjusted for inflation using movie ticket prices from NATO, with 2010 as the
base year. Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for movie data
Variable Obs. Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Total box office sales 8,738 17.7m 40.4m 45 936.7m
IMDB rating 8,738 6.4 1.0 1.1 10
Number of theaters 2,621 2,018 954.1 600 4,468
Production costs 2,621 32.9m 40.8m 5000 275m
Opening-week box office
sales
2,621 13.3m 18.3m 96,076 208.8m
“m” represents millions of US Dollars
5.2. The Existence of a Dip
Our theory predicts that a middle dip will occur in the association between movies’ box office sales
and average reviews when some movies are provided with substantially more resources than others,
as such investments may substantially increase sales. As demonstrated below, this investment pat-
tern occurs in the action/adventure genres, for which commercial success is crucial, but not in the
drama genre where maximizing artistic impact is more important and launching movies in numer-
ous theaters is less common. Hence, in the following paragraphs, we contrast the action/adventure
and drama genres, which are three of the largest movie categories.
Figure 6 plots how the average IMDB review score varies with the logged box office sales for all
movies in the action/adventure genres (Panel A, N=972) and for all movies in the drama genre
(Panel B, N=2,448) in our database.6 In the upper panels, the solid line is the average review score,
and the dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap simulation runs.
The lower panels show the proportion of observations for different box office sales intervals.
In the action/adventure genres (Panel A), there is a middle dip in the association between movies’
box office sales and average IMDB review scores. The average review score initially increases with
box office sales for movies earning less than 100,000 USD. It declines with box office sales for
movies with sales between 100,000 and 10 million USD (except for a kink around 5 million) and
5 The number of theaters in which a movie opened is a conservative measure of maximum audience size because a
movie can be played on multiple screens in one theatre, but the screen count is rarely published domestically.
6 These plots exclude box office intervals with fewer than five movies, which excluded 12 movies.
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Figure 6 Upper panels: association between box office sales and quality (average review scores in the IMDB
database). The solid line is the average, and the dashed lines are 95% bootstrap confidence intervals
based on 10,000 simulation runs. Lower panels: proportion of observations. Panel A is based on movies
in the action/adventure genres, and Panel B on movies in the drama genre.
then plateaus between 10 million and 25 million USD. Finally, it increases with box office sales for
movies making more than 25 million USD, the only exception being a dip at the top for movies with
sales above 800 million USD. In contrast, Panel B shows that in the drama genre, the association
between box office sales and review scores increases monotonically, except for a dip at the top for
movies with sales above 485 million USD.
Is the middle dip in the action/adventure genres’ sales-quality association reliable? To explore
this more systematically, we first fitted a cubic spline regression to the data. The results reveal
a non-monotonic association in the action/adventure genres, and a monotonic association in the
drama genre (see upper panels in Figure 7). The changes in sign roughly correspond with the
change in slope observed in the non-parametric plots in the upper panel of Figure 6.
Is the sign change detected by the cubic spline reliable? To answer this question, we rely on a
modified version of Simonsohn’s recently published “two-lines” test, which was developed to test
for possible u-shaped relationships that are less sensitive to functional form (i.e., quadratic or
cubic) assumptions (Simonsohn 2018). In brief, our modified tests work by fitting two regression
lines around the local minima and local maxima identified by the cubic spline, and testing whether
the signs in the estimated lines differ (see Appendix C for details). To maximize the test’s power to
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Figure 7 Upper panels: cubic splines fitted to data on box office sales and quality (average review scores in the
IMDB database). Lower panels: results of applying a modified “two-line test” to our data. Panels A
and B are based on movies in the action/adventure and drama genres, respectively.
detect sign changes, the regression lines are fitted around a new value—the so-called “Robinhood
cut-off”—rather than around the identified local minima or maxima. The purpose of this step in
the algorithm is to “reinforce the poorer” by allocating more observations to the side (above or
below the original cut-off) where the regression slope has weaker statistical power.
The lower panels of Figure 7 show the results of applying the algorithm to the action/adventure
and drama genres. The action/adventure genres are considered first. The cubic spline identifies a
local minimum and a local maximum. The estimated slope for movies above the local minimum
is positive (Z=12.57), while it is negative (Z=1.79) below the local minimum (the blue line). The
estimated slope for movies below the local maximum is positive (Z=3.03), while it is negative
(Z=2.49) for movies above the local maximum and below the local minimum (the red line). This
pattern is consistent with a middle dip in the association between box office sales and average
ratings of movies in the action/adventure genres. In contrast, in the drama genre, the estimated
slopes for movies below and above the saddle-point at around 35 million are both positive, implying
that the average rating is a monotonically increasing function of box office sales.
5.3. The Distribution of Outcomes and Investments
Why does a dip occur in the action/adventure genres but not in the drama genre? To explore
the immediate causes of the dip, the upper panels in Figure 8 plot the distribution of box office
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Figure 8 Upper panel: box office sales distributions for movies at different levels of IMDB ratings. Lower panel:
proportion of high- versus low-quality movies at different sales intervals. Panel A is based on movies in
the action/adventure genres, and Panel B on movies in the drama genre.
sales at three quality intervals. First, we consider the action/adventure genres. For movies in these
genres (Panel A), the distribution of box office sales exhibits a clear bimodal pattern at all quality
levels. Movies at all quality levels tend to do either relatively poorly or relatively well, whereas
intermediate levels of sales are less frequent. To test whether the outcome distribution is bimodal,
we fit (by maximum likelihood) a mixture of two normal distributions to logged box office sales.
At all three levels of quality, this mixture distribution fits the data better than a single normal
distribution, providing evidence of bimodality.7 For high-quality movies the highest mode occurs
at 122 million USD and the lowest at 1.4 million, for medium-quality movies the modes occur at 58
and 0.35, and for low-quality movies at 32 and 1.9 million USD. The bimodal distribution even for
low-quality movies shows that a low-quality movie can, occasionally, garner high box office sales.
To illustrate in greater detail how the proportions of high- and low-quality movies change with
sales, the lower panel in Figure 8 plots the proportion of high- versus low-quality movies (i.e., the
number of high-quality movies divided by the total number of high- and low-quality movies) at
different levels of sales. Consistent with our theoretical predictions (see Figure 3D), high-quality
movies are relatively more common than low-quality movies at both low and high sales levels.
7 The null hypothesis that the means and variances of the two distributions are identical is rejected at a p-value of
0.01.
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This, in turn, is why the middle dip occurs: low-quality movies are more common than high-quality
movies at extremely low sales levels, but there is also a wide region of medium levels of sales where
low-quality movies are most common.
Next, we consider the drama genre, for which the bimodality of box office sales is less obvious.
A mixture distribution still fits the data better than a normal distribution at all three levels of
quality, providing evidence of bimodality also in the drama genre. However, the lower panel in
Figure 8 reveals a crucial difference between the drama and action/adventure genres. In the latter,
low-quality movies are more frequent than high-quality movies at low and medium levels of box
office sales, whereas in the former, low-quality movies are the most frequent type of movie only at
low levels of box office sales. Thus, low-quality movies in the drama genre seldom reach medium
levels of box office sales.
Why do low-quality movies reach medium levels of box office sales in the action/adventure genres
but not in the drama genre? The reason seems not to be that the level of financial investment or
number of theaters in which a movie is launched matter less in the latter than in the former. A low-
quality movie launched in many theaters is substantially more likely to garner high box office sales,
regardless of genre. However, investment patterns differ significantly across the different genres
(see Figure 9). The distribution of the number of theaters in which movies are initially launched
is bimodal in the action/adventure genres, with the largest mode at 3,000 theaters and another
at 1,000.8 This finding reflects the fact that most action/adventure movies have major releases to
avoid box office failure and to compensate for their high production costs. The distribution of the
number of initial theaters in the drama genre has a tendency toward low values.
A final clue is that the correlation between average review scores/ratings and the number of
theaters in which a movie is initially launched is 0.23 for the action/adventure genres but minus
0.01 for the drama genre. Hence, the general public’s preferences are more predictable for most
action/adventure movies, and moviemakers may be confident in placing big bets on movies in these
two genres. However, even in these genres, these predictions are highly imperfect, implying that
moviemakers may invest substantially in what turn out to be low-quality movies with limited sales
potential. Overall, a dip emerges in the action/adventure genres because low-quality movies that
have received investment may achieve higher box office sales than high-quality movies that have
received less investment. In the drama genre, moviemakers are less likely to invest substantially in
perceived winners and there is no dip.
8 This is a truncated distribution, as we only have data on the initial number of theaters for a subset of movies that
sold well, whereas the overwhelming majority of movies for which we have no data were launched in only a few, and
certainly fewer than 1,000, theaters.
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Figure 9 Distribution of the number of theaters in which movies were initially launched
6. Discussion
6.1. When Does a Dip Occur?
The models and the empirical illustration show that a dip in the quality-outcome association may
occur when: i) both quality and other factors, which we label “resources”, impact the outcome;
ii) there is a bimodal distribution of resources (products/individuals receive either few or many
resources), possibly generated by a reinforcing process. Moreover, the impact of resources is large
enough for better resourced, low-quality products/individuals to achieve higher outcomes than
more poorly resourced, high-quality products/individuals; and iii) allocation mistakes are possible,
as low-quality products/individuals may receive a lot of resources and high-quality ones may not.
When do these conditions occur in reality? First, outcomes in many economic, cultural and
social settings may be impacted by factors other than “quality”. People or products that happen
to be in the right place at the right time may perform better than superior alternatives that
come later (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988, Salganik et al. 2006). However, this effect is not
always strong enough to generate a dip. The advantages of early success may be fleeting, and
high-quality late entrants may eventually outstrip early entrants (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995,
Tellis et al. 2009, Zhu and Iansiti 2012, van de Rijt 2019). Factors beyond quality that impact
on early success will have a larger impact on final outcomes when products and individuals that
do well initially are given additional resources to increase their chances of future success (Merton,
1968), when early failures are eliminated and not given a second chance (Rosenbaum 1979), when
products that become popular early on become well-known and acquire loyal followers, and when
consumers/evaluators have strong incentives to select an offering that seems (even only marginally)
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better than others (Vincenz and van de Rijt 2016). For example, early outcomes have a significant
effect on final outcomes in the movie industry, as a result of a) concentrating investment in movies
that appear promising early on, and b) reducing the number of theaters in which a movie with
poor opening-weekend box office sales is screened. In contrast, in settings where popularity only
impacts evaluations, not awareness or resources allocated, being selected early on may only weakly
increase the probability of being selected in the long term (Azoulay et al. 2014, van de Rijt 2019),
and a dip is unlikely to be observed.
Second, a dip requires that the resources distributed differ substantially between actors, so that
obtaining resources through means other than quality may propel a low-quality product/individual
toward a better outcome. This bimodal resource allocation pattern may be generated by a strong
reinforcing process, where initial success increases the chances of future success (Arthur et al. 1987).
A bimodal resource allocation may also be the result of a deliberate choice to focus investments
on promising candidates. In contrast, a dip is unlikely in settings where it makes sense to spread
investments to a wide range of candidates, thus creating a level playing field. Third, a dip requires
allocation mistakes, where low-quality products (individuals) are chosen over high-quality products
(individuals) or are provided with more resources. Even minimal randomness or uncertainty may
generate a dip: a dip will occur if there is some chance that two quality levels are mistaken (as
in the resource allocation model), but the dip will then be small, in that it will only hold for a
very narrow quality range. A dip occurring over a broad range of outcomes requires substantial
randomness, in that the lowest-quality offering in this range has some chance of being confused with
the upper-quality offering. Such randomness is realistic when there is high variance in outcomes
owing to variability in the context and the presence of confounding factors (for example, whether
other movies released on the same weekend are attractive) and when evaluations are based on small
samples. In contrast, randomness in evaluations is less likely when outcomes have low variance and
when quality can be accurately measured.
6.2. Implications for the Literature on Market Selection and Strategic
Opportunities
If there is a dip, inferences about quality based on a näıve, more-successful-is-better heuristic may
be misleading. Products or individuals with greater success but lower expected quality may be
evaluated as having higher quality than those with less success but higher expected quality. Of
course, not all evaluators care about expected quality. Investors (and funding agencies) may only
care about continued success. If past success strongly increases the chances of future success, it
may be rational to support a product that has succeeded in the past, regardless of its quality.
However, expected quality matters if observers want to learn from successful products or identify
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talented people, and care about expected success in a new round of competition (for example, a
new movie’s expected box office sales).
A dip will only lead to mistaken inferences if not all evaluators are sophisticated enough to per-
fectly understand that a dip may occur. Sophisticated evaluators understand how E[qi|mi,t] varies
with mi,t. It does not matter to them how quality varies with market share, whether increasing,
decreasing or following a complicated pattern. They may also rely on other information, such as on
firms’ available resources, in making inferences about quality. Our claim (which may be incorrect
in some contexts) is that not all evaluators understand or have access to the information necessary
to correct for the dip. Näıve evaluators, who assume that greater success implies higher quality,
will be misled by a dip. Sorenson and Waguespack (2006) offers evidence consistent with such näıve
evaluations in the movie industry, showing that movie distributors prefer to work with partners
whom they know well. There is also evidence that movies resulting from such collaborations have
higher box office sales. However, the reason for this correlation is that distributors allocate more
resources to these movies. When these resources are controlled for, the movies actually perform
worse in box office sales. The implication is that some movie distributors are näıve and over-rely
on misleading box office numbers without correcting for them.
Whether a dip leads to mistaken resource allocations also depends on whether a few sophisticated
investors, who seek to identify undervalued actors, will make the dip disappear as a result of
their arbitrage activities (thus helping to eliminate possible mismatches between resources and
talent/quality). Matching of resources and product quality is likely to improve over time if investors
are able to observe the outcomes of past competitions and attempt to identify “hidden gems” that
did reasonably well with few resources. For example, moviemakers may be able to detect skilled
directors who have performed well with few resources. More generally, if investors have access to
information about the levels of resource received by different products and whether they did well
initially, they should be able to determine more accurately which products and actors are of high
quality. The dip is therefore less relevant to markets in which a significant amount of information is
known about relevant actors (e.g., directors who have produced many movies), and more relevant
to markets in which there is a constant inflow of new products/actors of uncertain quality.
If a dip persists and not all evaluators are sophisticated, this has interesting implications for
evolutionary theories of the firm (Nelson and Winter 1982). Evolutionary theories of growth assume
that firms that do well in competition are more efficient or produce higher-quality products than
firms that do not. Profitable firms survive and expand, while unprofitable firms fail and contract.
This differential growth is the mechanism by which selection operates and through which industries
change over time (Nelson and Winter 1982). If a dip occurs and the resources to which firms have
access depend on the outcomes of previous competition (i.e., firms are self-financed), the argument
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based on differential growth may break down. For example, a low-quality moviemaker may end up
with a minor blockbuster, providing the funds necessary to bankroll the next movie. A high-quality
moviemaker who has been unlucky, received few resources and produced a poorly selling movie
will have few resources to invest in making the next movie. However, if the resources are provided
by sophisticated investors, the dip may not matter, as such investors may see through the dip and
allocate all their resources to firms with superior merit.
A dip also creates opportunities for more informed evaluators who understand the mechanism
that generates it (Denrell et al. 2019). Such foresighted investors may benefit from understanding
that quality is sometimes divorced from popularity (Csaszar and Laureiro-Mart́ınez 2018). If market
forces are too weak to eliminate dips, a dip may thus be a reliable source of arbitrage, and perhaps
competitive advantage, through cognitive superiority (Cattani et al. 2018, Menon 2018)
6.3. Implications for the Literature on Status and Quality
The possibility of a dip has important implications for how status and quality may become decou-
pled (Gould 2002, Lynn et al. 2009). Suppose the status of actor j relates to the number of other
actors who endorse or defer to that actor. Our model shows that if an endorsement is subject to
a strong reinforcing process, there may be a dip in the status-quality association. Specifically, the
model in Section 3 shows that a dip may occur if the probability that an evaluator will endorse
actor j depends on both quality and the proportion of others who have already endorsed that
actor. Existing models of status attainment can also be modified to generate a dip. Consider Lynn
et al. (2009)’s model of the effects of social influence on status attainment. Following Gould (2002),
they assume that the extent to which actor i endorses actor j depends on previous endorsements
by other actors (endorsements also reflect a concern for reciprocity, p. 770, equation 4b). Lynn et
al. (2009) assume that this social influence function is linear. Simulations of this model show that
it does not generate a dip. However, a dip does occur if social influence is instead assumed to be
a non-linear function of past attachments, matching our logit function (equation 1). Consistent
with this assumption of a non-linear function, empirical studies show that social influence is indeed
often a non-linear function of the number of past adopters (MacCoun 2012).
A dip represents a more fundamental decoupling of status and quality than shown in previous
studies. While previous research has focused on situations where the correlation is close to zero
(Lynn et al. 2009), our model shows that the correlation between status and quality may be negative
for some status intervals. The existence of such a dip has interesting implications for interpretations
of status and the persistence of a stratification system. Owing to the bimodal nature of outcomes in
a system with a dip, many individuals will end up with a status level that does not reflect their true
merit. Consider lucky individuals who achieve an unmerited high status. How will they react? One
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possibility is “imposter syndrome”, if they sense that they have been awarded a higher status than
they deserve. Another reaction is a desire to protect their privilege by erecting entry barriers and
using their resources to increase their offsprings’ chances of success. In systems with a dip, there are
also many unlucky individuals whose status is much lower than they merit. These individuals are
most likely to push to overturn the system, or rebel against it and create an alternative system of
stratification. As an example of this type of rebellion, consider the Sundance Film Festival (Ortner
2012), which was founded in 1978 to attract film makers to Utah but quickly became a focal
point for independent movies. Unless they are advertised and launched in many theaters, the box
office sales of high-quality, independent movies are likely to be several orders of magnitude lower
than the typical Hollywood blockbuster action movie. Frustrated by this inequality, independent
moviemakers coordinated and sponsored the Sundance Film Festival as a venue where they could
escape from the conventional use of box office sales as a status metric.
6.4. Implications for Performance Evaluation and Incentives
In a system with a dip, how can evaluators make more accurate inferences about quality from
observed outcomes and avoid being fooled by the dip? One possibility is to rely on additional
information about the resources to which actors have access. For example, moviemakers who have
done well with a limited budget may be of higher quality than those who have achieved similar
outcomes with large budgets. Even if evaluators do not have information about resources, they can
use information about the sequence of outcomes as a proxy. For example, in the model presented
in Section 3, we can condition on whether a product was chosen in the first period. Plotting the
quality-market share association separately for products that were or were not chosen in the first
period eliminates the dip in some cases. One example is when the market share is based on a limited
number of periods (e.g., t = 25) and the first period has a considerable impact on all remaining
periods.
Furthermore, if evaluators feel that a dip is undesirable, they may choose to limit the resources
allocated to early winners, when uncertainty about quality is highest, to avoid a dip and allow
for more accurate inferences about quality (see Bothner et al. (2011)). This may be especially
important if evaluators are unsure about how much additional resource increases the chances of
future success. If this information is known, evaluators can factor it in when evaluating outcomes;
but if the effect is uncertain, allocating a large amount of resources to some individuals complicates
evaluations of the outcomes. A dip also complicates performance-based incentives, because better
performance does not necessarily merit more positive evaluations or rewards. Thus, individuals in
the region of the dip may strive to worsen their performance (e.g., reduce it below the dip “danger
zone”) to be more favorably evaluated. To avoid such complications, management may decide to
avoid performance-based incentives altogether (Milgrom and Roberts 1988).
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6.5. Implications for Inequality
Our results may have important implications for interpreting social inequality. According to the
meritocratic ideal, income reflects individual traits such as cognitive skill (Herrnstein and Murray
1994). Sociologists and some economists have argued that the association between individual traits
and income is much weaker (Fischer et al. 1996, Bowles et al. 2001) because income is influenced
by other factors including luck (Jencks 1979, Frank 2016), socio-economic background (Blau and
Duncan 1967, Fischer et al. 1996) and adverse childhood experiences (Sharkey and Elwert 2011).
Our model of the outcome-quality dip suggests a third possibility—the relationship between income
and individual traits may be non-monotonic. A modified version of our model, in which income
depends on individual traits and stochastic shocks and is subject to reinforcement, may generate
an income-skill dip. Incomes may be subject to a process of cumulative disadvantage, as bad
luck and initial setbacks are amplified in a vicious circle (Elman and Angela 2004, Schafer et al.
2011, Maroto 2012). For example, failure to graduate, combined with high debt, may leave college
students in a poor financial situation, forcing them to accept any available job. If merit, such as
high cognitive skill, cannot compensate for such bad luck, individuals with superior merit may be
stuck at low income levels. Lucky or privileged individuals with medium cognitive skills may reach
medium incomes, although high incomes may require high skills in many occupations. Overall, this
suggests that the income-merit association may not only be low but negative for some medium
income levels, an implication which can be tested with data on cognitive skills and income.
6.6. Limitations
One of the main limitations is empirical. Additional and better data to the movie box office are
needed to assess how often a dip occurs, and when reinforcing processes are sufficiently strong. An
experiment involving many participants adopting an object/product might also be useful to test
more rigorously whether the mechanism in the model generates a dip. Furthermore, we assume
that many people will not understand and will be misled by a dip, but this assumption should be
examined experimentally. Theoretically, our mechanism needs further exploration. When does a
dip occur? Is a bimodal allocation necessary, or can a dip occur with smoother distributions? We
examined a non-linear Pólya urns model. Does a dip also occur for other reinforcing processes?
In particular, can a preferential attachment process (Barabasi and Albert 1999) also generate a
dip? The model in Section 3 assumed that consumers tend to choose products with the highest
market share. This type of social influence arises through a variety of mechanisms, such as network
externalities or because consumers rely on choices made by others to infer quality. If consumers
rely on others’ choices, the outcome depends on how sophisticated the consumers are. If they are
sophisticated and understand the possibility of a dip, they may infer that a product with a low
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market share is of superior quality and choose this product. This would contradict the assumption
that the value of b in the model is positive, which might undo the dip. Exit and market segmentation
might also influence the dip. Actors at some quality levels may exit owing to anticipated (or
past) poor evaluations by sophisticated evaluators. Exploring these dynamics formally would be
an interesting avenue for future research.
7. Concluding Remarks
We have formally and empirically demonstrated how a bimodal resource allocation, typically
enabled by reinforcing processes, can generate a middle dip in the outcome-quality association.
The intuition is that all actors or products who have been provided with many resources early on
will reach at least a medium-level outcome. Only low-quality actors or products will remain at a
medium-level outcome despite being well-resourced. An outcome just below medium level is more
impressive because it is likely to have been achieved despite having few resources. A dip complicates
evaluations, because evaluators must understand that a low outcome may indicate higher expected
quality than a medium-level outcome. To eliminate the dip, one should provide early winners with
extra resources only when they are clearly better than the rest. Ironically, people rely on initial
popularity precisely when quality is difficult to evaluate. When early winners are provided with
substantial resources, a dip may occur, distorting the meritocratic ideal.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Fixpoint Analysis
Lemma EC.1. Suppose the utility of selecting product 1 in period t is u1,t = aq1 + bm1,t−1 + ε1,t
and the utility of selecting product 2 is u2,t = a0.5 + b(1−m1,t−1) + ε2,t, where εj,t are independent
draws from an error distribution. Whenever the error distribution f(ε) is an unimodal distribution
(i.e., f(ε) is increasing for ε < β and decreasing for ε > β for some value β) and has infinite
support in at least one tail, then the probability of selecting product 1, P1,t, is i) an increasing
function of m1,t−1 and q1 ii) 0<P1,t < 1 for all m1,t−1 ∈ [0,1], iii) a convex function for m1,t−1 <
0.5−a(q1−0.5)/2b and a concave function for m1,t−1 > 0.5−a(q1−0.5)/2b, iv) P1,t = 0.5 whenever
m1,t−1 = 0.5 and q1 = 0.5.
Proof The probability of selecting product 1 is P1,t = Pr(u1,t >u2,t) which equals
Pr(u1,t >u2,t) = Pr(ε1,t− ε2,t >−a(q1− 0.5)− 2b(m1,t−1− 0.5)) (EC.1)
i) It follows that P1,t is an increasing function of m1,t−1 and q1. ii) Moreover, 0< P1,t < 1 for all
m1,t−1 ∈ [0,1] since Pr(ε1,t − ε2,t > −a(q1 − 0.5) + 2b(m1,t−1 − 0.5)) ∈ (0,1) for all m1,t−1 ∈ [0,1]
when f(ε) has infinite support in at least one tail.
iii) Purkayastha (1998) Theorem 2.2 shows that if X1 and X2 are independent random variables
with the same unimodal distribution then X1 −X2 is also unimodal with mode equal to zero.
Hence, ε1,t− ε2,t is unimodal with mode equal to zero, i.e., the density of ε1,t− ε2,t, g(ε1,t− ε2,t), is
an increasing function for ε1,t− ε2,t < 0 and a decreasing function for ε1,t− ε2,t > 0 Moreover, the
random variable ε1,t− ε2,t has mean zero and has a symmetric distribution, which follows from the
fact that ε1,t and ε2,t are identically distributed.
The derivative of P1,t with respect to m1,t−1 equals
δ
δm1,t−1
[1−G(−a(q1− 0.5)− 2b(m1,t− 0.5))] = 2bg(−a(q1− 0.5)− 2b(m1,t−1− 0.5)), (EC.2)
where g(d) is the density of d= ε1,t−ε2,t. The second derivative is −4b2g′(−a(q1−0.5)+2b(m1,t−1−
0.5)). Because g() is unimodal, with g′(d)> 0(< 0) for d < 0(> 0), it follows that P1,t is a convex
(concave) function of m1,t whenever −a(q1 − 0.5) − 2b(m1,t−1 − 0.5) < 0(> 0). That is, P1,t is a
convex function whenever m1,t−1 < 0.5− a(q1− 0.5)/2b and a concave function whenever m1,t−1 >
0.5− a(q1− 0.5)/2b.
iv) If m1,t−1 = 0.5 and q1 = 0.5, then P1,t = Pr(ε1,t − ε2,t > 0). Because ε1,t − ε2,t is symmetric
around zero it follows that P1,t = 0.5.
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Theorem EC.1. Suppose the utility of selecting product 1 in period t is u1,t = aq1+bm1,t−1+ε1,t
and the utility of selecting product 2 is u2,t = a0.5 + b(1−m1,t−1) + ε2,t, where εj,t are independent
draws from an unimodal error distribution with infinite support in at least one of the tails. Let
g(d) be the density of d= ε1,t− ε2,t. Let m∗1 be the market share firm 1 converges to as t→∞. i)
Whenever b < 1/2g(0), E[q1|m∗1] is an increasing function of m∗1 for all m∗1 ∈ [0,1]. ii) Whenever
b > 1/2g(0), E[q1|m∗1] is an increasing function of m∗1 for all m∗1 ∈ (0,ml), where 0<ml < 0.5, and
E[q1|m∗i ] is an increasing function of m1 for all m∗1 ∈ (mh,1), where 0.5 <mh < 1, but E[q1|m∗i ]
“dips” in the sense that E[q1|m∗1 =ml]>E[q1|m∗1 =mh].
Proof Let C(z1, q1) be the probability that the customer in period t+ 1 chooses the product
of firm 1 when m1,t = z1 and the quality of firm 1 is q1. That is C(z1, q1) = Pr(u1,t+1 >u2,t+1). To
simplify the notation we often write the choice probability as C(zi) and only include the quality
of the agent when necessary for the argument. When εj,t are independent draws from an unimodal
error distribution with infinite support in at least one of the tails, then it follows by Lemma EC.1
that 0 < C(z1) < 1 for all z1 ∈ [0,1]. It follows that there is at least one fixpoint of the mapping
zi =C(zi) in the interval z1 ∈ [0,1] (z1 cannot lie below C(z1) for all values z1 ∈ [0,1] or lie above
C(z1) for all values z1 ∈ [0,1]).
Let X be the set of stable fixpoints of the mapping C(z1) = z1, i.e., points at which C(zi) crosses
zi from above. Let Y be the set of unstable-fixpoints of the mapping C(z1) = z1, i.e., points at which
C(zi) crosses zi from above. Theorem 6.1 in Hill et al. (1980) imply that whenever 0<C(z1)< 1
for all z1 ∈ [0,1], then, for each r ∈X, there is a positive probability that z1 converges to r, while,
for each r ∈ Y , the probability that z1 converges to r is zero.
Let z11 be the “first” fixpoint of the mapping C(z1) = z1; “first” in the sense that z
1
1 is closest
to zero: z11 < z
k
1 for any other fixpoint k. Because C(z1 = 0)> 0, C(zi) crosses zi from above at z
1
1
(C(z1)> z1 for all z1 < z
1




1 can only exists if C(z1) increases faster than
z1 does, otherwise C(z1) remains below z1 for all z1 > z
1
1 . Moreover, C(z1) can only increase faster
than z1 does if the derivative of C(z1) with respect to z1 is larger than 1 for some z1 ∈ (0,1). The
derivative of C(z1) with respect to z1 equals (see Lemma EC.1)
δC(z1)
δz1
= 2bg(−a(q1− 0.5)− 2b(z1− 0.5)). (EC.3)
Because g() is unimodal with mode equal to zero (Lemma EC.1), the derivative reaches a maximum
at the value of z1 for which z1 = 0.5− a(q1 − 0.5)/2b. The value of the derivative at this value of
z1 is 2bg(0). A necessary condition for having more than one fixpoint is thus that 2bg(0)> 1, i.e.,
b > 1/2g(0).
If b < 1/2g(0), the derivative of C(z1) with respect to z1 is always below 1, implying there is only
one fixpoint of the mapping C(z1) = z1. If there is only one fixpoint, the value of z1 at which the
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fixpoint occurs is increasing in q1 because C(z1, q1) is increasing in q1 (Lemma EC.1i). It follows
that whenever b < 1/2g(0), there is a unique fixpoint that the market share of firm 1 converges to
as t→∞ and the value of this fixpoint is increasing in q1. Thus, whenever b < 1/2g(0), E[q1|m∗1] is
an increasing function of m∗1 for all m
∗
1 ∈ [0,1].
Suppose now that b > 1/2g(0). Consider the special case of qi = 0.5. We first show that for this
special case there are three fixpoints (two of which are stable). First, note that there is a fixpoint
at z1 = 0.5 since C(z1 = 0.5, q1 = 0.5) = 0.5 (Lemma EC.1iv). Denote this fixpoint by z
m
1 . Second,
there exists another fixpoint at z1 > 0.5. To show this, note that because δC(zi)/δzi > 1 at zi = 0.5,
there exists a region z1 ∈ (0.5,0.5 + ε) in which C(z1)> z1. Because C(z1) is an increasing function
and C(z1 = 1) < 1, there must exist another fixpoint z
h
1 > 0.5. There cannot be more than one
fixpoint for z1 > 0.5, however. The reason is that C(z1) is a concave function for z1 > 0.5 (Lemma
EC.1iii), implying that the value of the derivative is a decreasing function. Hence, once δC(z1)/δz1
drops below one it stays below one, implying that C(z1) remains below z1 for all z1 > z
h
1 . A similar
argument shows that when b > 1/2g(0) there exists a third fixpoint zl1 in the interval z1 ∈ (0,0.5). A
fixpoint of the mapping z1 =C(z1) is stable at z1 = z
∗
1 if δC(z1)/δz1 evaluated at z1 = z
∗
1 is smaller
than one and unstable otherwise. It follows that when b > 1/2g(0) then the two fixpoints zli and
zhi are stable while z
m
1 is unstable. If b < 1/2g(0), however, there is only one fixpoint and because
δC(z1)/δz1 < 1 for all z1 this fixpoint is stable.
We next show that whenever b > 1/2g(0), there are also two stable fixpoints for values of q1 close
to 0.5. That is, there exists an interval around q1 = 0.5, I = (0.5− e,0.5 + e) where e ∈ (0,0.5),
such that for all q1 ∈ I the mapping z1 =C(z1) has two stable fixpoints in z1 ∈ [0,1]. To show this,
consider first qualities just above 0.5. We know that C(z1 = 0, q1 = 0.5 + e)> 0 (Lemma EC.1ii).
We also know that C(z1 = 0.5, q1 = 0.5+e)>C(z1 = 0.5, q1 = 0.5) = 0.5 (Lemma EC.1). Let z
∗
1 be a
value of z1 < 0.5 at which C(zi, q1 = 0.5)− zi is the most negative, i.e., where C(zi, q1 = 0.5) is the
farthest below zi (see Figure EC.1A). Note that at z
∗
1 the choice probability for the higher quality
level will be higher: C(z∗1 , q1 = 0.5 + e)>C(z
∗
1 , q1 = 0.5). By continuity, however, we can find some
increase in quality from 0.5, i.e., find some value of e∈ (0,0.5) such that C(z1 = z∗1 , q1 = 0.5+e)< z∗1 ,
i.e., so that the choice probability at a market share of z∗1 is still below z
∗
1 (see Figure EC.1A). For
this value of e, the function C(z1, q1 = 0.5 + e)− z1 crosses the zero line at least once before z∗1 ,
because it started (at z1 = 0) above zero. The function C(z1, q1 = 0.5 + e)− z1 has to cross the zero
line again before z1 = 0.5 because C(z1 = 0.5, q1 = 0.5 + e)− 0.5 > C(z1 = 0.5, q1 = 0.5)− 0.5 = 0.
It cannot cross the zero line more than twice for z1 ≤ 0.5, however, because C(z1, q1 = 0.5 + e) is
increasing and has a derivative with respect to z1 which is initially increasing and then decreasing
in z1 (Lemma EC.1iii). Finally, there has to be another fixpoint at market share above 0.5 (z1 >
0.5) because C(z1 = 1, q1 = 0.5 + e) < 1. This fixpoint is stable because the function C(z1, q1 =
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C(z⇤1 , q1 = 0.5 + e)
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Figure EC.1 Illustration of Proof
0.5 +e)− z1 crosses the zero line from above (the derivative is decreasing after the second unstable
fixpoint). Thus, there exists some value of e such that the function C(z1, q1 = 0.5 + e)− z1 has two
stable fixpoints, one occurring before z1 = 0.5 and one occurring after.
Consider next qualities just below 0.5. We know that there is some value zb1 < 0.5 such that
C(zi = z
b
1, q1 = 0.5) = z
b
1, i.e., there is a fixpoint before z1 = 0.5 when q1 = 0.5. Because C(z
b
1, q1 =
0.5− e)<C(zb1, q1 = 0.5) and C(z1 = 0, q1 = 0.5− e)> 0, there has to be a fixpoint below z1 = 0.5
for q1 = 0.5− e (see Figure EC.1B). There can only be one fixpoint before z1 = 0.5, however, since
C(z1, q1 = 0.5− e) < C(z1, q1 = 0.5), i.e., the choice probability is always lower for lower quality
and for quality equal to 0.5 the second fixpoint is at q1 = 0.5. Let z
∗
1 be a value of z1 > 0.5 at
which C(zi, q1 = 0.5)− zi is the most positive, i.e., where C(zi, q1 = 0.5) is the farthest above zi
(see Figure EC.1B). Note that at z∗1 the choice probability for the lower quality level will be lower:
C(z∗1 , q1 = 0.5− e)<C(z∗1 , q1 = 0.5). By continuity, however, we can find some decrease in quality
from 0.5, i.e., find some value of e∈ (0,0.5) such that C(z1 = z∗1 , q1 = 0.5− e)> z∗1 , i.e., so that the
choice probability at a market share of z∗1 is still above z
∗
1 . Because C(z1 = 0, q1 = 0.5− e)> 0 and
C(z1 = 1, q1 = 0.5− e)< 1, there has to be three fixpoints for this value of e. Due to the concavity
of the choice function after the third fixpoint there can only be three fixpoints and the first and the
third are stable. Thus, there exists some value of e such that the function C(z1, q1 = 0.5− e)− z1
has two stable fixpoints, one occurring before z1 = 0.5 and one occurring after.
This argument shows that whenever b > 1/2g(0) there exists some interval around q1 = 0.5 such
that for qualities in this interval there are two stable fixpoints, one below 0.5 and one above, both
increasing in q1.
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Next we show that for firms with qualities outside this interval there exists only one fixpoint.
Consider first firms with qualities q1 > 0.5 which have no fixpoint at z1 < 0.5, i.e., for which there
is no value of e∈ (0,0.5) and z1 < 0.5 such that C(z1, q1 = 0.5 + e)< z1. For these firms, there is at
least once fixpoint at some z1 since C(z1 = 0, q1 = 0.5 + e)> 0 and C(z1 = 1, q1 = 0.5 + e)< 1. This
fixpoint has to occur at a value z1 > 0.5. Only one fixpoint can occur because the inflection point
of C(z1, q1 = 0.5 + e), at which the second derivative changes from positive to negative, occurs at
a value z1 < 0.5 for q1 > 0.5 (Lemma EC.1iii). For all z1 > 0.5, the derivative is thus decreasing.
Hence, once the function C(z1, q1 = 0.5 + e) crosses the line z1 it remains below. Because it crosses
the line from above, the fixpoint is stable.
Consider next firms with qualities q1 < 0.5 for which there is no e∈ (0,0.5) such that C(z1, q1 =
0.5− e) ≥ z1 for some value z1 > 0.5. For these firms, there is at least one fixpoint since C(z1 =
0, q1 = 0.5 + e) > 0 and C(z1 = 1, q1 = 0.5 + e) < 1. This fixpoint has to occur at a value z1 < 0.5
by assumption. Only one stable fixpoint can occur because the derivative of C(z1, q1 = 0.5 + e) is
increasing for all z1 < 0.5 when q1 < 0.5 (Lemma EC.1iii).
Overall, when b > 2 there are three regions of quality. i) For firms with qualities q1 ∈ [0,0.5− el)
there is one stable fixpoint, below 0.5, the value of which is increasing in q1. ii) For firms with
qualities q1 ∈ (0.5− el,0.5 + eh), there are two stable fixpoints, one below and one above 0.5, the
values of which are increasing in q1. iii) For firms with qualities q1 ∈ (0.5 + eh,1] there is one stable
fixpoint, above 0.5, the value of which is increasing in q1.
These three regions of quality map into three regions of market share. Consider firms with quality
q1 ∈ [0,0.5− el), where there is one fixpoint. Each quality level maps onto a unique market share,
m∗1 ∈ (0,ml), that a firm with this quality converges to. Moreover, no other firm with quality larger
than 0.5− el can converge to such a market share because its choice probability is larger than ml
at z1 =ml. There is thus a one-to-one mapping between qualities q1 ∈ [0,0.5− el) and the market
share, m∗1 ∈ (0,ml), where ml,1 < 0.5, a firm converges to. It follows that E[q1|m∗1] is an increasing
function of m∗1 for all m
∗
1 ∈ (0,ml). For similar reasons, there is also a one-to-one mapping between
quality q1 ∈ [0.5+eh,1) and the market share a firm converges to, m∗1 ∈ (mh,1), where 0.5<mh < 1.
It follows that E[q1|m∗1] is an increasing function of m∗1 for all m∗1 ∈ (mh,1).
Consider, next, qualities in the interval q1 ∈ (0.5− el,0.5 + eh), for which there are two stable
fixpoints. Focus first on the lower fixpoint for each q1. It is also increasing in q1. Let mlow be
the largest value of this lower fixpoint, associated with quality equal to 0.5 + eh. We know that
mlow < 0.5. We also know that the lowest fixpoint a firm in the interval q1 ∈ (0.5− el,0.5 + eh) can
converge to is higher than the highest fixpoint a firm in the interval q1 ∈ (0,0.5− el) can converge
to. There is thus a one-to-one mapping between the value of the lowest fixpoint for firms in the
interval q1 ∈ (0.5− el,0.5 + eh) and their level of quality. Focus next on the larger fixpoint for each
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q1. It is also increasing in q1. Let mlarg be the lowest value of this lower fixpoint, associated with
quality equal to 0.5− el. We know that mlarg > 0.5. We also know that the largest fixpoint a firm
in the interval q1 ∈ (0.5−el,0.5+eh) can converge to is lower than the lowest fixpoint a firm in the
interval q1 ∈ (0.5 + el,1) will converge to. There is thus a one-to-one mapping between the value of
the largest fixpoints for firms in the interval q1 ∈ (0.5− el,0.5 + eh) and their level of quality.
Overall then, each level of market share is associated with a unique level of quality that can
converge to this level of market share (but a given level of quality may be associated with two
different levels of market share, see Figure 4). For m∗1 ∈ (0,mlow), where mlow < 0.5, the level of




1 ∈ (mlarg,1), the level of quality
associated with m∗1 is also an increasing function of m
∗
1. However, the level of quality associated
with m∗1 =mlow is lower than the level of quality associated with m
∗
1 =mlarg because mlarg > 0.5
is associated with a firm with quality below 0.5 while mlow < 0.5 is associated with a firm with
quality above 0.5.
Theorem EC.2 (Logit Choice Model). Suppose the utility of selecting product 1 in period
t+ 1 is u1,t+1 = aq1 + bm1,t + ε1,t+1 and the utility of selecting product 2 is u2,t+1 = a0.5 + b(1−
m1,t) + ε2,t+1, where εj,t+1 are independent draws from an extreme value distribution with density





Let m∗1 be the market share firm 1 converges to as t→∞. i) Whenever b < 2, E[q1|m∗1] is an
increasing function of m∗1 for all m
∗
1 ∈ [0,1]. ii) Whenever b > 2, E[q1|m∗1] is an increasing function
of m∗1 for all m
∗
1 ∈ (0,ml), where 0<ml < 0.5, and E[q1|m∗i ] is an increasing function of m∗1 for all
m∗1 ∈ (mh,1), where 0.5<mh < 1, but E[q1|m∗i ] “dips” in the sense that E[q1|m∗1 =ml]>E[q1|m∗1 =
mh].
Proof For the logit model, the density of d = ε1,t − ε2,t, equals g(d) = e−d/(1 + e−d)2 (e.g.,
Maddala, 1983, p. 60). Thus, g(0) = 0.25 and 1/2g(0) = 2. The conclusion follows by Theorem
EC.1.
Theorem EC.3 (Probit Choice Model). Suppose the utility of selecting product 1 in period
t+ 1 is u1,t+1 = aq1 + bm1,t + ε1,t+1 and the utility of selecting product 2 is u2,t+1 = a0.5 + b(1−
m1,t) + ε2,t+1, where εj,t+1 are independent draws from a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance one. Let m∗1 be the market share firm 1 converges to as t→∞. i) Whenever b <
√
π,
E[q1|m∗1] is an increasing function of m∗1 for all m∗1 ∈ [0,1]. ii) Whenever b >
√
π, E[q1|m∗1] is an
increasing function of m∗1 for all m
∗
1 ∈ (0,ml), where 0<ml < 0.5, and E[q1|m∗i ] is an increasing
function of m∗1 for all m
∗
1 ∈ (mh,1), where 0.5 < mh < 1, but E[q1|m∗i ] “dips” in the sense that
E[q1|m∗1 =ml]>E[q1|m∗1 =mh].



































































Figure EC.2 Average quality associated with different market share levels when b = 2.5 and when quality was
drawn from a beta distribution with parameters a) (α= 3, β = 1) (skewed towards high values) b)
(α = 3, β = 3) (mean 0.5 and concentrated around 0.5) or c) (α = 1, β = 3) (skewed towards low
values).
Proof For the probit choice model, the density of d= ε1,t− ε2,t, is a normal density with mean











The conclusion follows by Theorem EC.1.
Appendix B: Robustness Analyses
Quality Distribution
The model in section 3 assumed that quality was uniformly distributed but the basic result—a dip
occurs when b is large enough—holds for many alternative assumptions about the quality distri-
bution. Suppose, for example, that quality was drawn from a beta distribution with parameters a)
(α= 3, β = 1) (skewed towards high values) b) (α= 3, β = 3) (mean 0.5 and concentrated around
0.5) or c) (α= 1, β = 3) (skewed towards low values). Figure EC.2A-C shows that the dip occurs,
when b= 2.5, at about the same level of market share as in Figure 1B. Moreover, Theorem EC.2 in
Appendix A shows that a dip occurs, in the long-run (as t→∞), whenever b > 2 for any continuous
quality distribution with support (0,1).
Many Products
The model in section 3 analyzed competition between two products, with one having a fixed level
of quality. A dip also occurs in a model with many competing products, each with its quality
drawn from a uniform distruibution. To illustrate this, suppose there are n products. The quality
of product i is qi, where qi is drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and one. The utility
of product i in period t is ui,t = aqi + bmi,t−1, where mi,t is the market share of product i in period
t− 1 (we set mi,0 = 1/n). The probability that product i is selected in period t is the multinomial




uj,t). Such a model also generates a dip if b is large enough, as illustrated
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Figure EC.3 How average quality varies with market share for different values of b (each line is based on 1 million
simulations of 1000 periods in which a= 1 and n= 10).
in Figure EC.3. Figure EC.3 shows how average quality varies with the market share obtained
after 1000 periods for different values of b when n= 10 (ten actors) and a= 1. Higher market share
indicates higher average quality only when b= 2 or b= 3. For b= 4 or b= 5, higher market share
does not indicate higher average quality but the function relating market share and quality “dips”.
Alternative Choice Models
The model in section 3 assumed that consumer choice followed the logit choice model but a dip
also occurs for other assumptions about the choice process. The crucial aspect of the logit choice
model, that gives rise to the dip, is the initial convexity and the eventual concavity of the logit
choice function, i.e., 1/(1 + exp(−b(m− 0.5))) is convex for m< 0.5 and concave for m> 0.5. If b
is large enough (b > 2), then the derivative at m= 0.5 is larger than 1, and these properties will
guarantee that there will be three fixpoints of the function 1/(1 + exp(−b(m− 0.5)))−m: one at
a value m< 0.5, one at m= 0.5, and one at m> 0.5 and the first and the third of these fixpoints
will be stable.
What other choice models share these essential features? As Lemma 1 in Appendix A shows, a
large class of so called ’random utility models’ do share these features and also generate a a dip if b
is large enough (Theorem EC.1). The logit model can be derived as a random utility model in which
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individual i selects product 1 if ui,1 + ε1,i >ui,2 + ε2,i, where εj,i are independently drawn from an
extreme value distribution with density f(ε) =Exp(−ε− e−ε). Lemma EC.1 in Appendix A shows
that any random utility model in which individual i selects product 1 if ui,1 +ε1,i >ui,2 +ε2,i, where
εj,i are independently drawn from a unimodal distribution has the same essential features (convex
for m< 0.5 and concave for m> 0.5) and also generates a dip (Theorem EC.1). The intuition is
that if εj,i are drawn from an unimodal distribution, values of ε2,i − ε1,i close to zero are more
likely than large or negative values. As a result, if ui,1 is much larger than ui,2, the probability
that product 1 will be chosen is close to one and will not increase much if ui,1 increases by a given
amount.
This class of random utility models with unimodal error terms is quite broad and includes the
logit but also the probit choice model, the two most commonly used choice models. Indeed, Theorem
EC.3 shows that for the probit choice model, a dip occurs whenever b >
√
π. What does this class
of random utility models exclude? It excludes choice models in which the error terms are drawn
from a bimodal distribution. If the error terms were drawn from a bimodal distribution, with a
density which reaches a minimum at zero, then the choice function would be concave for m< 0.5
and convex for m> 0.5, implying there is only one fixpoint and there is no dip.
A dip occurs in the short-run (for low values of t) even for choice models that do not imply a dip
asymptotically (as t→∞). For example, a dip occurs in the short run for a linear probability model:
P1,t+1 = wq1 + (1−w)m1,t. For example, a dip occurs after 100 periods whenever 0 < w < 0.243.
If w = 0.1, a dip occurs even after 20,000 periods. Why does a dip occur even when the choice
model is linear? The reason is that if w is low the outcome in the first period has a long-term
effect. For example, suppose w= 0.2 and consider a product with quality q1 = 0.5. If this product
is not chosen in the first period the choice probability in the second period decreases to 0.1. Unless
the product is selected in the second period, the choice probability remains at this low level. On
average it takes ten periods before this product is selected again. Even if the product is selected
after ten periods, the choice proportion will remain low, resulting in a low choice probability. If the
product had been selected in the first period, however, the choice probability would have increased
to 0.9 and the product would have been very likely to be selected in the second period and the
choice proportion would likely have remained high. As this illustration shows, the outcome in the
first period can have a long-term impact even when the choice model is linear. The outcome in the
first period does not have a permanent effect, however, if the choice model is linear. Rather, the
choice proportion will eventually converge to q1 as t→∞ regardless of the outcome in the first
period and regardless of the value of w. The reason is that z∗ = q1 is the only solution for z ∈ (0,1)
to the equation z =wqi + (1−w)z.
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Figure EC.4 How how i) mkj,t−1 varies with mj,t−1 ii) how the choice probability varies with the market share
for three different levels of quality (equal to 0.8, 0.5, and 0.2) and iii) how average quality, in
period 100, varies with the obtained market share (based on 500,000 simulations) for different
combinations of k and b (when a= 1).
Concave or convex market share effects
The model in section 3 assumed that utility was a linear function of past market share. Consider
a slightly more general model where uj,t = aqj + bm
k
j,t−1. If k < 1, utility is a concave function of
market share and if k > 1 utility is a convex function of market share. Computations show that
a dip occurs, when b is high enough in both cases, but if k differs significantly from one a dip
only occurs if b is high. The intuition is that when k differs significantly from one, the utility of
a product is not impacted by changes in market share at high (concave functions) or low (convex
function) values of market share. Figure EC.4 illustrates the impact of convexity and concavity.
Figure EC.4 shows how a) mkj,t−1 varies with mj,t−1 b) how the choice probability varies with the
market share for three different levels of quality (equal to 0.8, 0.5, and 0.2) and c) how average
quality, in period 100, varies with the obtained market share (based on 500,000 simulations). When
k= 3, we still get a dip when b= 2.5 even if mkj,t−1 is a convex function, because the logit function,
1/(1 + exp(−b(x))), is concave for x > 0. Even when k = 5 we get a dip when b= 3.3; in fact we
get two dips. Consider, next, the case with a concave function. When k = 0.5 a dip occurs when
b= 2.5, again because the logit function, 1/(1 + exp(−b(x))), is convex for x < 0. When k = 0.2 a
dip occurs with b= 3.5.
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a = 1, b = 0.03, 500 periods















Figure EC.5 How a) average quality varies with market share in period 500 and b) a histogram of the obtained
market share when a= 1 and b= 0.03.
Numbers versus proportion
Suppose uj,t = aqj + bnj,t−1 where nj,t−1 is the number of consumers that have selected product j
during periods 1 to t−1. If b is large enough, this model also implies that product 1 either obtains a
very high or very low market share but this model does not generate a dip. Rather, average quality
is an increasing function of the obtained market share. To illustrate this, Figure EC.5 shows a) how
average quality varies with the market share of product 1 in period 500 and b) a histogram of the
resulting market share, when a= 1 and b= 0.03 (based on 1 million simulations). The market share
of product 1 tends to be close to zero or one but there is no dip. The crucial difference between
this model and the model in section 3 is that in this model quality does not matter in the long-run.
When t is large, n1,t−1−n2,t−1 will become a very large positive or negative number and the term
b(n1,t−1−n2,t−1) will dominate over a(q1−0.5) in the choice probability. Thus, in the long-run, the
choice probability will become one or zero, regardless of the quality of product 1.
To understand the dynamics of this model, it is useful to consider the extreme case when only
quality matters when |n1,t−1 − n2,t−1| < c (i.e., suppose that b = 0 and a = 1 whenever |n1,t−1 −
n2,t−1|< c) and quality does not matter whenever |n1,t−1−n2,t−1|> c (consumers choose the leading
product with probability one whenever |n1,t−1−n2,t−1|> c). For this extreme version of the model,
quality only matters initially and only determines whether product 1 or product 2 wins in the
long-run and the time until one of the barriers is reached (n1,t−1−n2,t−1 > c or n1,t−1−n2,t−1 < c).
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The higher the value of q1, the higher the probability that product 1 wins in the long-run (i.e.,
the barrier n1,t−1 − n2,t−1 > c is crossed) and the more quickly this will happen. In the long-run,
market share converges to one or zero, and the probability that a product 1 with quality q1 reaches
a market share equal to one is the probability that the barrier n1,t−1−n2,t−1 > c is crossed before
n1,t−1−n2,t−1 < c. This probability is an increasing function of q1. Hence, expected quality will be
higher for products that converge to a market share equal to one than for products that converge
to a market equal to zero.
Appendix C: Statistical Tests for a Dip
Is the change in sign detected by the cubic spline statistically significant? This question can be
answered by fitting a cubic spline, calculate confidence intervals for the predicted review score, and
test whether there are box office values for which the effect of box office is significantly negative.
As Uri Simonsohn has recently demonstrated, however, such a test has low statistical power and
can both fail to detect a change in sign and falsely detect it when it is not present (Simonsohn
2018). The problem is that such a test is sensitive to departures from the assumed functional form
(i.e., quadratic or cubic). Simonsohn shows that an algorithm with superior statistical power, for
detecting whether a function is u-shaped, is an algorithm that fits separate lines: one for high
values of x and one for low values. We adopted this method to test whether a dip occurs by fitting
two lines around each “kink” in the data and testing whether the signs around the kinks differ.
In brief, the modified algorithm works as follows (see Simonsohn 2018, for technical details).
First, we fit a cubic spline regression to the data. Based on the cubic spline regression, we identify
any local maxima and minima, i.e., x-values where the predicted y-value is a local maximum or a
local minimum. For example, in the action/adventure genres the cubic spline regression identifies
a local maximum at a box office of about 50,000 dollars and a local minimum at about 3 million
dollars. Second, we apply Simonsohn’s algorithm to test whether the change in sign around a local
maximum or minimum is significant. When we use this algorithm, we only rely on data around the
local maximum or minimum. That is, to test whether the change in sign around the local minimum
at 3 million is significant, we use data on a) all movies in the action/adventure genres with box
office above 3 million and b) all movies with box office below 3 million and above 50,000 dollars, i.e.,
above the local maximum. Similarly, to test whether the change in sign around the local maximum
at around 50,000 is significant, we use data on a) all movies in the action/adventures genres with
box office below 50,000 and b) all movies with box office above 50,000 and below 3 million, i.e.,
below the local maximum. For the movies from the drama genre, where the cubic spline shows a
monotonic pattern with only one change in slope at around 35 million, we use data on all movies
above or below this change in slope.
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The purpose of these first two steps, which is our modification of Simonsohn’s method, is to
create two sets of data, each of which is then analyzed by Simonsohn’s original method. Third, we
fit a linear regression with separate slopes above and below the cutoff used (i.e., the local minimum
or maximum). Fourth, to maximize the power of the test to detect a change in sign, we change
the cutoff, from the local maximum or minimum, to a new value, called a “Robinhood Cutoff”.
The purpose of changing the cutoff is to allocate more observations to the side (above or below
the original cutoff) where the regression slope was less significant. For example, in this fourth step,
the cutoff changes from the local minimum at around 3 million to a value of about 5 million (see
Figure 7A, Lower Panel), to allow for more observations in the middle range of box office.
Appendix D: Simulations and Numerical Integration
Figures 1 to 3 are not based on simulations but on numerical integration of the equations specifying
the expected level of quality of firm 1 given the market share obtained after t periods. We first
explain the basis for the numerical integrations and then show how to replicate the results using a
simple simulation program.
Suppose firm 1 has market share m1,t after t periods. We wish to calculate E[q1|m1,t]. A given
level of market share can always be translated in the number of consumers out of t that choose the
product of firm 1, nt. We thus seek the expected level of q1 given that firm 1 is chosen k times in
t periods. This can be computed as
E[q1|nt = k] =
∫ q1=1
q1=0
q1f(q1|nt = k)dq1 (EC.5)
where f(q1|nt = k) is the conditional density of the quality distribution given that firm 1 chosen k
times in t periods. Bayes rule implies that








where Pr(nt = k|q1) is the probability that a firm 1 with quality q1 is chosen k times in t periods
and f(q1) is the density of the quality distribution. Using Bayes rule E[q1|nt = k] can thus be
written as
E[q1|nt = k] =
∫ q1=1
q1=0




To compute E[q1|nt = k], we need to compute Pr(nt = k|q1), for any value of q1. Computing
Pr(nt = k|q1) can be done recursively, starting from period one. In the first period, Pr(n1 = 1|q1) =
1/(1+e−a(q1−0.5)). The probability that firm 1 is chosen in the second period depends on the market
share after period one: P1,2 = 1/(1 + e
−a(q1−0.5)−2b(m1,1−0.5)). There are only two possible values
of m1,1, however: firm 1 was chosen or not in the first period. To compute Pr(n2 = k|q1) we a)
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compute the choice probability for each of these two possible outcomes in the first period and b)
weigh these two possibilities by their probabilities, i.e., weigh them by Pr(n1 = 1|q1). Proceeding
in the same manner, Pr(nt = k|q1) can be computed for any period t. When Pr(nt = k|q1) have
been computed, we then compute E[q1|nt = k] by numerical integration of the numerator and
denominator of equation EC.7.
Alternatively, a simple simulation program can compute E[q1|m1,t] (and modification of this
program can be used to compute Figures 2 and 3). The Matlab program below simulates the
competition between firm 1, with quality q1, and firm 2, with quality 0.5, each for t periods. This
simulation is repeated ns times. The result is an array with ns market shares (”ms”) and another
array with ns quality levels (”qual”). Using these two arrays, one can plot the average quality level
within different market share intervals, as an approximation to E[q1|m1,t].
ns = 50000; % number of simulations
t = 100; % number of periods
a = 1; % parameter in choice rule
b = 2.5; % parameter in choice rule
ms = zeros(ns,1); % market share
rr = rand(t,ns); % uniform random numbers
%-----draw qualities from uniform distribution
qual = rand(ns,1);
%-------the main simulation loop for each pair of firms
for i = 1:ns
n = 0; % number of times firm 1 get chosen
q = qual(i,1); % the quality of firm 1
m = 0.5; % initial market share set to 0.5
for j = 1:t % simulation loop for each period
pr = 1/(1+exp(-a*(q-0.5)-2*b*(m-0.5))); % equation 1
if(rr(j,i) < pr)
n = n+1; % if gets chosen, then add 1
end
m = n/j; % market share = proportion of periods firm 1 was chosen
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end % end of the periods
ms(i,1) = n/t; % save the market share this firm 1 obtained
end % end of the simulations
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